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NOTE

Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp.:
Comity in International Judicial Relations

I. Introduction
In an economically interdependent world, cooperation and
comity' among sovereign nations take on paramount importance.2
Disputes arising out of international commercial transactions
naturally present the possibility of concurrent jurisdiction in the
courts of the parties' respective nations Concurrent jurisdiction
carries a concomitant risk that the parties will seek relief in
different forums, resulting in duplicative, burdensome, and
possibly even vexatious litigation However, if one nation's court
attempts to forestall this type of litigation by ordering the parties to
I "Judicial comity" is defined as "[t]he principle in accordance with which the
courts of one state or jurisdiction will give effect to the laws and judicial decisions of
another, not as a matter of obligation, but out of deference and respect." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 267 (6th ed. 1990).
Comity also has been defined as "the basis of
international law, a rule of international law, a synonym for private international law, a
rule of choice of law, courtesy, politeness, convenience or goodwill between sovereigns,
a moral necessity, expediency, reciprocity or 'considerations of high international
politics concerned with maintaining amicable and workable relationships between
nations."' Joel R. Paul, Comity in InternationalLaw,32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 3-4 (1991)
(footnotes omitted).
2 Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 624, 629 (5th Cir. 1996) (Garza, J.,
dissenting), reh "g,en banc, denied, 83 F.3d 421 (5th Cir. 1996), petition for cert.filed
(U.S. June 17, 1996).
3 See Gau Shan Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349, 1354 (6th Cir. 1992) (
"In an increasingly international market, commercial transactions involving players from
multiple nations have become commonplace" and "[e]very one of these transactions
presents the possibility of concurrent jurisdiction .... ); Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena,
Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 952 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("The reality of our
interlocked international economic network guarantees that overlapping, concurrent
jurisdiction will often be present.").
4 See China Trade & Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir.
1987) (recognizing that the district court had found that foreign litigation would be
vexatious to the plaintiff and would cause "additional expense"); Bethell v. Peace, 441
F.2d 495, 498 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding that the district court was within its discretion to
relieve plaintiff of expense and vexation of litigating in a foreign court).
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refrain from suing in a foreign forum, its action may insult the
foreign court.5 As a result, relations between the nations may
suffer a disturbing tension.6 It was this conundrum between
vexatious litigation and the possibility of international unease
which faced the Fifth Circuit in Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp.7
In Kaepa, the Fifth Circuit held that a federal district court did
not abuse its discretion by enjoining a party from asserting mirrorimage claims in a foreign forum where such foreign litigation
would cause "inequitable hardship" and "tend to frustrate and
delay the speedy and efficient determination of the cause."8 The
Fifth Circuit's holding underscores a debate which has continued
among the circuit courts for decades.9 On the one hand, several
circuits adopt the Fifth Circuit's relaxed standard of comity which
allows a district court to interfere with a foreign forum's
jurisdiction where foreign litigation would be duplicative or
vexatious.' ° On the other hand, several other circuits follow a
stricter standard of comity which gives deference to foreign courts
unless to do so would threaten the jurisdiction of the district court
I See Gau Shan, 956 F.2d at 1355 (stating that an antisuit injunction "conveys the
message ...that the issuing court has so little confidence in the foreign court's ability to
adjudicate a given dispute fairly and efficiently that it is unwilling even to allow the
possibility"). In addition, a court order forbidding parties to sue in other forums,
although not directed at the foreign court, has the effect of denying the foreign court an
opportunity to hear the dispute. Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 413 (1964).
See generally, George A. Bermann, The Use of Anti-Suit Injunctions in International
Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 589 (1990) (discussing the development of
antisuit injunctive relief affecting foreign forums).
6 Such tension arose in Laker Airways, where the D.C. Circuit responded bitterly
to the United Kingdom's foreclosure of any non-English proceeding to enforce
American antitrust policy, stating that it was "a naked attempt exclusively to reserve by
confrontation an area of prescriptive jurisdiction shared concurrently by other nations."
731 F.2d at 954.
7 76 F.3d 624 (5th Cir. 1996).
8 Id. at 627 (quoting In re Unterweser Reederei, GmBH, 428 F.2d 888, 896 (5th
Cir. 1970), aff'd on reh 'g en banc, 446 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1971), vacated sub nom., M/S
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972)).
9 See, e.g., Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. Inc. v. Bull Data Sys., Inc., 10 F.3d 425, 43132 (7th Cir. 1993); Seattle Totems Hockey Club Inc. v. National Hockey League, 652
F.2d 852, 856 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1105 (1982); Bethell v. Peace, 441
F.2d 495, 498 (5th Cir. 1971); Unterweser, 428 F.2d at 896; Sperry Rand Corp. v.
Sunbeam Corp., 285 F.2d 542 (7th Cir. 1960); China Trade & Dev. Corp. v. M.V.
Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1987); Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 927;
Canadian Filters Ltd. v. Lear-Siegler, Inc., 412 F.2d 577, 578 (1st Cir. 1969).
10 See infra notes 62-101 and accompanying text.
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or allow the evasion of important public policies."
Part II of this Note will examine the facts and procedural
history of the Kaepa case and discuss the majority and the
dissenting opinions in the Fifth Circuit." Part III will explore the
background law leading up to Kaepa.3 Part IV will assess the
significance of Kaepa in light of these past holdings. 4 Finally, in
Part V, the Note concludes that although the Fifth Circuit's
holding in Kaepa clarified its standard of comity, it leaves in
question the proper role of the judiciary in international relations."
The conclusion explains that the political branches of government
are better suited than the judiciary to maintain relations with
foreign nations." For this reason, the legislative and executive
branches of government should determine foreign policy, while
courts should exercise only their judicial authority in presiding
over private disputes.
II. Statement of the Case
A. The Facts and the District Court Ruling
In April 1993, Kaepa, Inc. ("Kaepa"), an American athletic
footwear manufacturer, entered into a distributorship agreement
with Achilles Corp. ("Achilles"), a Japanese business entity with
annual sales of approximately one billion dollars. 7 By the terms
of the agreement, Achilles received an exclusive right to market
Kaepa's shoes in Japan. 8 Furthermore, the agreement stipulated
that United States law and the English language would govern the
interpretation of the agreement, and that Achilles consented to the
jurisdiction of the Texas courts'9

I See infra notes 102-43 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 17-58 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 59-146 and accompanying text.
"4 See infra notes 147-66 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 167-79 and accompanying text.
16 Paul, supra note 1, at 75-76.
1' Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 624, 625 (5th Cir. 1996), reh'g, en banc,
denied, 83 F.3d 421 (5th Cir. 1996), petitionfor cert.filed (U.S. June 17, 1996).
18

Id.

19 Id. at 625-26 & n.l.
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In July 1994, after becoming increasingly dissatisfied with
Achilles' performance of the contract, Kaepa filed suit in Texas
state court. 20 In its complaint, Kaepa alleged: "(1) fraud and
negligent misrepresentation by Achilles to induce Kaepa to enter
into the distributorship agreement, and (2) breach of contract by
Achilles."2 Achilles timely removed the case to the United States
District Court for the Western District of Texas. Once in federal
district court, Achilles participated with Kaepa in extensive
discovery. 23 Then, in February 1995, more than six months after
the filing of the original suit, Achilles unexpectedly filed a
separate action in a Japanese court.24 In the Japanese suit, Achilles
made two claims which essentially mirrored Kaepa's original
claims: (1) fraud by Kaepa to induce Achilles to enter into the
distributorship agreement, and (2) breach of contract by Kaepa
In response, Kaepa filed a motion to enjoin Achilles from
prosecuting the Japanese action.26 Achilles, in turn, filed a motion
to dismiss the federal court action on the grounds of forum non
conveniens. 7 The district court denied Achilles' motion to dismiss
and issued an injunction ordering Achilles to abort its prosecution
of the Japanese action and to file its counterclaims with the district
28

court.

B. The Fifth CircuitDecision
The Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court's injunction,
focusing on Achilles' three arguments: (1) that the district court
had failed to give proper deference to principles of international
Id. at 626.
Id.
22 Id.at 624, 626.
23 Id. at 626. The court noted that the discovery process had been "laborious" and
that, by the date of appeal, the parties had accumulated tens of thousands of documents.
Id.
24 Id.
25 Id. Achilles conceded that the Japanese action was a compulsory counterclaim
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a). Id. at 628 n.14 (citing FED. R. CIv. P.
13(a)). However, since the injunction was upheld, the court declined to rule on the
whether Rule 13(a) applied to claims brought in foreign courts. Id.
26 Kaepa, 76 F.3d at 626.
27 Id.
28 Id.
20

21
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comity in granting its injunction;2 9 (2) that by not conducting a
hearing on Kaepa's motion to enjoin, the district court had failed
to grant the notice and opportunity to be heard prerequisite to the
issue of an injunction;3 ° and (3) that the district court had failed to
require Kaepa to post a bond which is also prerequisite to the issue
of an injunction.3
In its analysis, the Fifth iCircuit used a
deferential "abuse of discretion" standard
to determine the
32
propriety of the district court's injunction.
In addressing the issue of international comity, the Fifth
Circuit noted that the circuit courts agree that federal courts have
the power to enjoin persons subject to their jurisdiction from
prosecuting foreign suits. 33 The "court then acknowledged that
"[t]he circuits differ... on the proper legal standard to employ
when determining whether that injunctive power should be
exercised. 34 Relying on its own previous decisions,35 the court
stated the rule in the Fifth Circuit:
a district court does not abuse its discretion by issuing an antisuit
injunction when it has determined "that allowing simultaneous
prosecution of the same action in a foreign forum thousands of miles
away would result in,'inequitable hardship' and 'tend to frustrate and
delay the speedy and efficient determination of the cause. '36

The court defended its rule stating that, "even though the
29

Id.

Id. at 628. In response to this argument, the Fifth Circuit held that since the
injunction was not based on any disputed facts, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did
not require an oral hearing. Id. (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(1)). Rather, the parties'
written memoranda were sufficient to meet the requirements of notice and opportunity to
be heard. Id.
31 Id. In response to this argument, the Fifth Circuit noted that the district court is
required to secure the posting of a bond, "in such sum as the court deems proper .... "
Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 65(c)). The Fifth Circuit noted that since the amount of the
bond is a matter of discretion, the district court may seek no bond at all. Id. (citing
Corrigan Dispatch Co. v. Casa Guzman, 569 F.2d 300, 303 (5th Cir. 1978)).
32 Id. at 626. Under the abuse of discretion standard, findings of fact are upheld
unless clearly erroneous and legal conclusions are reversed if incorrect. Id.
30

33 Id.

Id.
Id. at 626-627 (citing Bethell v. Peace, 441 F.2d 495, 498 (5th Cir. 1971) and In
re Unterweser Reederei, GmBH, 428 F.2d 888, 890, 896 (5th Cir. 1970), aff'd on reh'g
en banc, 446 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1971), vacated sub nom. M/S Bremen v. Zapata OffShore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972)).
36 Id. at 627 (quoting Unterweser,428 F.2d at 896).
34

35
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standard... focuses on the potentially vexatious nature of foreign
litigation, it by no means excludes the consideration of principles
of comity. ' '37 The court pointed out that although other circuits
"give greater deference to comity and apply [a] more restrictive
standard[,]" the Fifth Circuit declined "to require a district court to
genuflect before a vague and omnipotent notion of comity every
time that it must decide whether to enjoin a foreign action."3
Applying its standard of comity to the lower court's injunction
of Achilles' Japanese litigation, the Fifth Circuit first examined
whether the antisuit injunction in this case posed an actual threat to
relations between the United States and Japan.39 It concluded that
because (1) "no public international issue was implicated by the
case" and (2) the dispute had, for several months, been in the
American legal system with Achilles' complete participation, there
was no threat to notions of comity posed by the district court's
injunction.4° Proceeding to inquire into the vexatious nature of the
Japanese litigation, the Fifth Circuit concluded that prosecution of
the Japanese suit would constitute "an absurd duplication of
effort[,] '41 and that Achilles' filing, in Japanese court, of claims
mirroring Kaepa's claims in American court "smack[ed] of
cynicism, harassment, and delay. 42 Based on these findings, the
majority held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
issuing an injunction enjoining the prosecution of the Japanese
43
suit.
C. Dissentto the Fifth CircuitDecision
The dissent in Kaepa illustrated that the conflict among the
circuit courts may also exist within a circuit.44 The dissent
cautioned the majority against ignoring the principles of

37

Id.

38

Id.

39 Id.

40Id.
41

Id. (quoting Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., Inc., 10 F.3d 425, 430-31

(7th Cir. 1993)).
42 Id. at 627-28.
43 Id. at 628.

44Id. at 629 (Garza, J., dissenting).
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international comity because "[u]nless we proceed in each
instance with respect for the independent jurisdiction of sovereign
nation's courts, we risk provoking retaliation in turn, with
detrimental consequences that may reverberate far beyond the
particular dispute and its private litigants." 45 The dissent also
lauded the stricter standard of comity, noting that "the standard
followed by the Second, Sixth, and D.C. Circuits more
satisfactorily respects the principle of concurrent jurisdiction and
safeguards the important interests of international comity. ' O
Conversely, the dissent denounced the majority opinion, stating
that it "does not grant the principle of international comity the
weight it deserves ....4
The dissent proclaimed that it would have applied the strict
standard of comity in judging the district court's injunction.
Under the dissent's standard, two factors would determine the
propriety of an antisuit injunction: "(1) whether the foreign action
threatens the jurisdiction of the district court; and (2) whether the
foreign action was an attempt to evade important public policies of
the district court."49
The dissent noted that the first factor
distinguishes between foreign actions that are interdictory and
those that are merely parallel."0 Where the foreign action is
interdictory, that is it seeks to "carve out exclusive jurisdiction
over the action[,]"' the first factor permits a defensive injunction
to protect the jurisdiction of the issuing court. 2 However, in this
case, the dissent found no direct threat to the jurisdiction of the
district court.53 The dissent continued by noting that the second
45 Id. (Garza, J., dissenting).
46 Id. at 632 (Garza, J., dissenting).
47 Id. at 629 (Garza, J., dissenting).

Id. at 632 (Garza, J., dissenting).
49Id. (Garza, J., dissenting).
50 Id. at 633 (Garza, J., dissenting).
48

51Id. at 632 (Garza, J., dissenting).
52 Id. at 632-33 (Garza, J.,
dissenting).
53 Id. at 633 (Garza, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that where two simultaneous
proceedings are in rem or quasi in rem, the second proceeding may threaten the
jurisdiction of the first because the second court may order the property upon which the
first court's jurisdiction is based to be moved out of the first court's jurisdictional
boundaries. Id. (Garza, J., dissenting). Also, the dissent cited Laker Airways as an
instance where an antisuit injunction was properly issued under the stricter standard of
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factor protects the "important policies of the forum. 5 4 According
to the dissent, there is a significant difference between the policy
interest of a forum in enforcing its statutes and the policy interest
of having disputes settled in a single forum." Of the latter, the
dissent stated that it does not "outweigh the important interests of
international comity. ' '56 From this analysis, the dissent found that
there was no evidence that Achilles sought to evade any important
policy of the United States forum. 7 Therefore, the dissent
concluded the district court had abused its discretion in issuing an
injunction against Achilles' Japanese action.
Il. Background Law
In deciding Kaepa, the Fifth Circuit was faced with a division
of authority regarding the proper standard of international comity
applicable to antisuit injunctions affecting foreign jurisdictions.59
Whereas the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth circuits apply a standard
which focuses on the vexatious nature of foreign litigation subject
to an injunction or other court action, 0 the First, Second, Sixth,
and D.C. circuits, insist that a stricter standard is necessary to
prevent the erosion of the international economy.6
A. The Relaxed Standard
Prior to Kaepa, the Fifth Circuit had applied a relaxed standard
of comity in antisuit injunctions.
For example, in In re
62
UnterweserReederei, GmBH, the Fifth Circuit faced the question
of whether a district court, sitting in admiralty, abused its
comity. Id. (Garza, J.,dissenting) (citing Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World
Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). For a discussion of Laker Airways, see infra
notes 108-22 and accompanying text.
54 Kaepa, 76 F.3d at 634 (Garza, J., dissenting).
55Id. (Garza, J., dissenting).
56 Id. (Garza, J., dissenting).
57Id. (Garza, J., dissenting).
58 Id. (Garza, J., dissenting).
56 Id. at 627.
60 Id. at 627 & n. 10, 11; see also infra notes 62-101 and accompanying text.
61 Id. at 627 & n. 12; see also infra notes 102-43 and accompanying text.
428 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970), aff'd on reh g en banc, 446 F.2d 907 (5th Cir.
1971), rev'don other grounds sub nom., M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S.
1(1972).
62
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discretion in enjoining a German company from instituting an
action concerning the same matter in the High Court of Justice in
London.6 Answering the question in the negative, the court noted
that "[a] court of equity has the traditional power to enjoin parties,
properly before it, from litigating in another court." 64 The court
continued that the power to enjoin "ha[d] been exercised where the
foreign litigation would: (1) frustrate a policy of the forum issuing
the injunction; (2) be vexatious or oppressive; (3) threaten the
issuing court's'in rem jurisdiction or quasi in rem jurisdiction; or
(4) where the proceedings prejudice other equitable
considerations., ' The court only briefly addressed the issue of
comity, stating that although "a domestic court has no power to
restrain the courts of a foreign nation, it has admitted power to deal
with litigants properly before it. An exercise of the latter power is
not the assumption of the former., 66 Since the district court had
found that the English action would have caused undue delay and
"inequitable hardship," 67 the Fifth Circuit found no abuse of
discretion in the district court's injunction.68
Less than one year later, the Fifth Circuit again faced the issue
of international comity in Bethell v. Peace.69 There, the Fifth
Circuit upheld Florida law which allowed courts to enjoin parties
from pursuing foreign litigation if such litigation would be
vexatious or would allow the evasion of state law.7" Bethell
63 Id. at 890. The Fifth Circuit's analysis in this case appears to have ignored the
fact that the contract between the plaintiff and the defendant contained a forum selection
clause which specified that disputes arising out of the contract "must be litigated before
the High Court of Justice in London, England." Id. at 889. This is contrary to Kaepa,
where the Fifth Circuit's holding upheld a forum selection clause. Kaepa, Inc. v.
Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 624, 627 (5th Cir. 1996), reh'g, en banc, denied, 83 F.3d 421
(5th Cir. 1996),petitionfor cert.filed (U.S. June 17, 1996).
64 Unterweser, 428 F.2d at 890.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 892.
However, the Supreme Court has stated: "'[t]he fact ... that an
injunction issues only to the parties before the court, and not to the court, is no evasion
of the difficulties that are the necessary result of an attempt to exercise that power over a
party who is a litigant in another and independent forum."' Donovan v. City of Dallas,
377 U.S. 408, 413 (1964) (quoting Peck v. Jenness, 48 U.S. 612, 625 (1849)).
67 Unterweser, 428 F.2d at 896.

68

Id.

69

441 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1971).
Id. at 498.

70
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involved a Florida real estate broker's contract to purchase
property in the Bahamas owned by several Florida residents who
had signed the contract, and one Bahamian who had not signed the
contract.71 Because the district court had already found the
agreement "invalid on its face,"72 the Fifth Circuit held that the
district court did not abuse its discretion "in relieving the plaintiff
73
of expense and vexation of having to litigate in a foreign court.,
The relaxed standard of comity was also applied by the Ninth
Circuit in Seattle Totems Hockey Club v. National Hockey
League. 4 In this antitrust case, the plaintiffs had contracted to sell
a fifty-five percent interest in the Seattle Totems to one of the
defendants, Northwest Sports, which owned the Vancouver
Canucks.75 However, instead of performing the contract, the
plaintiffs sued to have the agreement declared void and
unenforceable, alleging that the defendants had engaged in
unlawful monopolization of the ice hockey industry. 76 Twentyseven months later, the defendant brought claims for breach of
contract in the British Columbia Supreme Court.77 Subsequently,
the district court granted the plaintiffs' motion to enjoin the
Canadian litigation.7" The Ninth Circuit upheld the injunction
stating that the breach of contract claims brought by the defendant
in Canadian court were actually compulsory counterclaims in the
American antitrust action.79 On the issue of comity, the court
seemed poised to apply a strict standard stating the power to enjoin
Id. at 496.
Id. at 498.
73 Id. The court did find that the district court's injunction was too broad because
it seemed to affect the rights of persons who were not parties to the litigation. Id. at 49899.
74 652 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1105 (1982).
71 Id. at 853 &n.1.
76 Id. at 853.
77 Id. The contract had been executed in Vancouver, British Columbia, and
provided that the laws of British Columbia would govern the interpretation of the
agreement. Id. at 853 n. 1.
78 Id. at 853.
71 Id. at 854. Although the contract in dispute stipulated that Canadian law would
govern, the court held that because procedural issues are governed by the local forum,
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rather than Canadian law, determined whether the
claims were compulsory counterclaims. Id. (citing FED. R. CIv. P. 13(a)).
71
72
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parties from bringing foreign actions should be "used sparingly."8
However, the court proceeded to apply a standard of vexatiousness
declaring that allowing "separate actions [would] likely ...result
in unnecessary delay and substantial inconvenience and expense to
the parties and witnesses."'"
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that the district court had not abused its discretion in
enjoining defendants from instituting the Canadian action. 2
Normally, the relaxed standard of comity is justified as
favoring the convenience of the parties. 3 However, in Allendale
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Bull Data Systems, Inc.,s the Seventh
Circuit, applying the relaxed standard of comity, upheld an
injunction of litigation in a foreign forum which arguably may
have been more convenient to the parties than the American
forum.85 In this massive fire insurance litigation, the district court
had issued a preliminary injunction against Bull Data Systems,
Inc., the U.S. subsidiary of a French corporation, owned in large
part by the government of France, to abstain from pursuing an
action in a French forum, the Commercial Court of Lille. 6 In
upholding the injunction, the Seventh Circuit noted that "at first
glance ...enjoining what is practically an arm of the French
state.., from litigating a suit on a French insurance policy in a
French court may seem an extraordinary breach of international
comity."87
However, the Seventh Circuit noted that the
Commercial Court of Lille was really a panel of arbitrators that

80 Seattle Totems, 652 F.2d at 855 (quoting Philp v. Macri, 261 F.2d 945, 947 (9th
Cir. 1958)).
81 Id. at 856.
82

Id.

83 See Seattle Totems, 652 F.2d at 856; Bethell v. Peace, 441 F.2d 495, 498 (5th
Cir. 1971); In re Unterweser, GmBH, 428 F.2d 888, 890 (5th Cir. 1970), aff'd on reh'g
en banc, 446 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1971), vacated sub nom., M/S Bremen v. Zapata OffShore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972); see also Philips Medical Sys. Int'l B.V. v. Bruetman, 8
F.3d 600, 605 (7th Cir. 1993) ("This increasingly is one world and we have difficulty
seeing why the usual and by no means stringent rules for limiting duplicative litigation
should stop at international boundaries.").
84 10 F.3d 425 (7th Cir. 1993).
85 Id. at 428.
86 Id. at 427.
87 Id. at 428.
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had no clerical staff and that did not hear live witnesses.8
According to the Seventh Circuit, a tribunal of this nature is not
equipped "to resolve a massive document case." 9 Therefore, the
Seventh Circuit concluded that if it allowed the French proceeding
"there would be clear prejudice to Allendale... ."" The Seventh
Circuit faced the difficult issue of comity stating that "[a]ll the
considerations bearing on the grant of preliminary relief support
[the preliminary injunction]-with the possible exception of
international comity."'" Here the Seventh Circuit noted that where
the strict standard of comity presumes that an antisuit injunction
poses a threat to international comity, the relaxed standard requires
"some empirical flesh on the theoretical skeleton. 92 Furthermore,
the Seventh Circuit explained, the presence of substantial U.S.
interests will weigh against a threat to comity.93 Finding that the
U.S. interest in protecting its corporate citizens from excessive
insurance claims was substantial, 94 the court held that the
injunction was within the equity power of the district court.95
Contrary to the impression left by Allendale, the relaxed
standard of comity will not allow a district court to block any
foreign litigation between the parties before the court. For
example, in Sperry Rand Corp. v. Sunbeam Corp.,96 the Seventh
Circuit applied a standard of vexatiousness to German patent and
trademark infringement litigation which had been enjoined by the
district court.9" In reversing the lower court injunction, the
Seventh Circuit noted that the litigation in Germany involved a
trademark registered in Germany and that the cause of action arose
88
89

Id. at 429.
Id. at 430.

90 Id.
91

Id. at431.

92 Id. Without stating a clear test, the Seventh Circuit suggested that the relaxed
standard of comity would likely "consider tangible evidence of a threat to
comity .... " Id. at 432.

93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 433. Acknowledging that it was making a debatable decision, the Seventh
Circuit noted that whether the injunction was within the equity power of the district
court was "not free from doubt." Id.
96 285 F.2d 542 (7th Cir. 1960).
97 Id. at 545.
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under German trademark infringement laws.98 Thus, because the
litigation pending in the district court would not resolve issues
pending in the German forum, the Seventh Circuit found that the
German litigation was not vexatious to the defendant.99
Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit held that the lower court had
erroneously granted the injunction enjoining the German
litigation. "°
The cases cited above from the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth
circuits illustrate the development of a relaxed standard of comity.
Under this standard, a district court may enjoin parties subject to
its jurisdiction from prosecuting vexatious foreign litigation if
there is a duplication of parties and issues.10 ' In order to more fully
understand the role of comity in relations, it is instructive to
compare this rule to the strict standard of comity held by other
circuits.
B. The Strict Standard
The First, Second, Sixth, and D.C. circuits apply a stricter
standard of comity than the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth circuits. The
circuits applying a stricter standard will generally uphold an
antisuit injunction, which restricts the jurisdiction of a foreign
forum, only if the foreign litigation would: (1) threaten the
jurisdiction of the district court, or (2) permit an evasion of
important policies of the forum."'2
In 1969, the strict standard of international comity was

Id. at 544. In addition, the Seventh Circuit plainly was influenced by the
possibility of prejudice to the plaintiffs that the injunction created. Id. at 545. The court
stated that the longer two trademarks remain in side-by-side use, "the greater is the
presumption that confusion between them is unlikely." Id. at 546. Therefore, by
extending the side-by-side use of the products in Germany, the injunction may have
adversely affected plaintiffs infringement action in the German forum. Id.
98

99 Id. at 545.
100 Id. at 546.

See Gau Shan Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349, 1353 (6th Cir. 1992)
(noting that "[tihe Ninth and Fifth Circuits hold that a duplication of the parties and
issues, alone, is generally sufficient to justify the issuance of [a foreign suit]
injunction"); Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 928
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting that "[s]ome courts issue the [foreign suit] injunction when the
parties and issues are identical in both actions").
101

102 Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 927.
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introduced in CanadianFiltersLtd. v. Lear-Siegler,Inc. 3 In this
patent infringement case, the First Circuit overruled a district
court's injunction enjoining the defendant's litigation on a
Canadian patent in the Canadian Exchequer Court.'0° The court
based its decision on a respect for the jurisdiction of the Canadian
court warning that "the direct effect of the district court's action on
the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign requires that such action be
taken only with care and great restraint."'' 5 However, the court
stated that comity must yield where "the [issuing] forum seeks to
enforce its own substantial interests, or in limited circumstances
when relitigation would cover exactly the same points, as, for
example when both suits are in rem... .,,06 Because the Canadian
litigation involved a foreign patent right outside the district court's
jurisdiction, the First Circuit concluded that comity must prevail
and vacated the district court's injunction. 7
The exceptions to comity presented by the First Circuit in
Canadian Filters were clarified in Laker Airways v. Sabena,
Belgian World Airlines."8 In Laker Airways, the D.C. Circuit
upheld an injunction enjoining a Dutch airline and a Belgian
airline from filing actions in England's High Court of Justice.' 9
The D.C. Circuit first observed that "[t]here are no precise rules
governing the appropriateness of antisuit injunctions.""' However,
the D.C. Circuit then announced the rule that an anti-foreign-suit
injunction violates the principles of comity unless it "is necessary

103 412 F.2d 577 (lst Cir. 1969).

104 Id. at 579. The plaintiff sought declaratory relief from the district court to the
effect that defendant's U.S. patent and its very similar Canadian patent on certain filters
were invalid. Id. at 578. The defendant responded by filing suit in the Canadian
Exchequer alleging that the plaintiff had infringed its Canadian patent by producing
certain fans. Id.
1o5 Id. at 578.
106 Id. at 579.
107 Id. Interestingly, because the injunction had been in effect for almost a full court
year, the court felt that corrective action was required. Id. Accordingly, in a unique
showing of deference, the First Circuit ordered the district court not to take action for
almost one year to allow the Canadian court an opportunity to catch up. Id.
108 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
109

Id. at 956.

11o Id. at 927.
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to prevent an irreparable miscarriage of justice..' To clarify what
it meant by "irreparable miscarriage of justice," the D.C. Circuit
stated that "[i]njunctions are most often necessary to protect the
jurisdiction of the enjoining court, or to prevent the litigant's
evasion of the important public policies of the forum."" 2 In
reviewing the lower court's injunction, the D.C. Circuit observed
that the British government was hostile to American antitrust
policy. "3 In passing the Protection of Trading Interests Act, 14 the
British government had legislatively empowered the "English
Secretary of State" ' to designate foreign laws which persons6
conducting business in the United Kingdom were to disregard."
Pursuant to this legislation, the English Secretary of State had
issued an order prohibiting non-American airlines doing business
in the United Kingdom from complying with American antitrust
policy. 17 The English Court of Appeal had upheld the order as
valid"' and subsequently had enjoined Laker Airways from
pursuing American antitrust claims against two British airlines. " 9
Based on the British court's injunction of Laker Airways' antitrust
claims against the two British airlines, the D.C. Circuit perceived
the British court as a threat to the district court's jurisdiction over
Laker Airways' claims against other foreign airlines. 2 The court
also noted that the availability of a British injunction of American
litigation constituted an opportunity for the defendant airlines to
evade important antitrust policies of the U.S. forum. 2 ' Because
11' Id.
112

Id.

113 Id. at915,

953.

114 Id. at 920 (citing Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11 (Eng.)).
115

Id. at 920

116

Id.

117

Id.
Id. (citing British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways, 3 W.L.R. 545, 575, 591 (Eng.
C.A. 1983)).
"19 Id. The D.C. Circuit noted later that the British executive had effectively tied
the hands of the British judiciary. Id. at 947. By making it unlawful for the British
airlines to comply with discovery requests, the English secretary of state had made the
American case "wholly untriable." Id. Therefore, the British court had no choice other
than to enjoin the American litigation. Id.
120 Id. at 930-31, 934.
121 Id. at 934.
118
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the British courts were likely to be hostile to the district court's
jurisdiction, the D.C. Circuit upheld the district court's antisuit
injunction as a defensive action. 22
The Second Circuit refined the D.C. Circuit's analysis in Laker
Airways to an explicit two-factor test in China Trade.,&
Development Corp. v. M V. Choong Yong.123 In China Trade, the
Second Circuit applied the strict standard of comity and reversed a
district court injunction enjoining a Korean shipping company
from commencing an action in a Korean forum. 2 4 The case arose
out of a contract to ship soybeans from the United States to
China.'25 Unfortunately, the ship ran aground and the soybeans
were ruined. 2 6 As a result, the Chinese importer filed a breach of
contract claim in federal district court'27 and the Korean shipping
company filed an action for the equivalent of a declaratory
judgment in the Korean forum.'28 In reversing the lower court
injunction of the Korean action, the Second Circuit stated that
compared to vexatiousness and the risk of a "race to judgment,"'29
two factors were of much greater significance: "(A) whether the
foreign action threatens the jurisdiction of the enjoining forum,
and (B) whether strong public policies of the enjoining forum are
threatened..
"0
,
The Second Circuit then noted that although
the parties and issues were exactly the same in the foreign
litigation, 3 ' the Korean court had taken no action to restrict the
jurisdiction of the district court.' Thus, the Second Circuit found
122

Id. at 956.

123

837 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1987).

124

Id. at 37.
Id. at 34.
Id.

125
126

127 Id. To establish jurisdiction, the federal district court for the Central District of
California had attached the defendant's ship. Id. To secure the release of the ship and
the refiling of the action in the Southern District of New York, the defendant had
provided $1,800,000, the value of the ship, as security. Id. As part of this agreement
with the plaintiff, the defendant also waived any right to a dismissal of the new action

based on forum non conveniens. Id.
128 Id. at 35.
129 Id. at 36.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 36, 37.
132 Id. at 37.
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that there was no threat to the jurisdiction of the district court.133
The Second Circuit also was not persuaded that the Korean
shipping company, by filing the Korean action, intended to evade
important policies of the United States forum. 13 4 Therefore, the
Second Circuit reversed the injunction against the Korean shipping
135
company.
Significantly, the circuit courts in Laker Airways and China
Trade used precisely the same test, but came to opposite results. 36
While China Trade shows that the strict standard of comity limits
the power of federal courts to restrain the jurisdiction of foreign
forums, Laker Airways illustrates that the strict standard of comity
does notbar all anti-foreign-suit injunctions. Thus, the difference
between these two holdings demonstrates the great deference to
international comity in these circuits as well as the limits of that
deference.
Finally, in 1992, the Sixth Circuit, following the. Second and
D.C. circuits' strict standard of comity, decided Gau Shan Co. v.
Bankers Trust Co.'37 There, the Sixth Circuit held that a
preliminary injunction enjoining an American bank from litigating
a parallel claim in a Hong Kong forum constituted an abuse of
discretion by the district court.138 In this case, the district court had
combined the strict and relaxed standards by holding that "because
parallel proceedings duplicate the parties and issues, the federal
courts' important public policy of a just, speedy and inexpensive

133

134

Id.

Id.
Id. In China Trade, the Second Circuit unequivocally rejected the analysis of
the district court which closely resembled the relaxed standard of comity. Id. at 35.
After determining that the Korean action entailed a duplication of parties and would
have been adequately disposed of by the American action, the district court concluded
that the Korean litigation would be vexatious and would encourage a race to judgment.
Id. Based on these findings the district court permanently enjoined the Korean action.
Id.
136 Compare China Trade, 837 F.2d at 37 (reversing the district court's injunction),
with Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 956 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (affirming the district court's injunction).
137 956 F.2d 1349 (6th Cir. 1992).
138 Id. at 1358. The original claim brought in the federal district court alleged that
the defendant had fraudulently induced the plaintiff to sign a promissory note and asked
for rescission of the note. Id. at 1352. Prior to the filing of the federal court action the
defendant had threatened litigation in Hong Kong to collect on the note. Id.
135
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determination... ; would be evaded [by allowing them] ...

""9

The Sixth Circuit held that the district court had erred in
characterizing the interest in a just and speedy trial as an
"important public policy," as that term is applied under the' strict
standard of comity.'40 The Sixth Circuit, quoting China Trade,
took the view that while an injunction could be appropriate if "a
party attempts to evade compliance with a statute of the forum that
effectuates important public policies, an injunction is not
appropriate merely to prevent a party from seeking 'slight
advantages in the substantive and procedural law to be applied in a
foreign court."",14' Like the Second Circuit's holding in China
Trade, the Sixth Circuit found that the Hong Kong litigation posed
no threat to the district court's jurisdiction. 1'2 Therefore, the Sixth
Circuit held4 that the district court had erred in granting the
injunction. 1
The case law leading up to Kaepa shows that the circuits were
deeply divided as to the proper standard of international comity
applicable to anti-foreign-suit injunctions. The First, Second,
Sixth, and D.C. circuits were following a stricter standard of
comity that gave deference to foreign courts unless to do so would:
(1) threaten the jurisdiction of the district court; or (2) allow the
evasion of important public policies.'" The Fifth, Seventh, and
Ninth circuits were applying a relaxed standard of comity that
permitted a district court to enjoin foreign litigation if: (1) a policy
of the forum would be frustrated; (2) the foreign litigation would
be vexatious; (3) the district court's jurisdiction would be
threatened; or (4) the proceedings would prejudice other equitable
considerations.' 4 However, under the relaxed standard, it had

139 Id. at 1354.

140Id. at 1358.
141Id. at 1357 (quoting China Trade & Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d

33, 37 (2d Cir. 1987)).
142 Id. at 1356.
143Id. at

1358.

1 China Trade, 837 F.2d at 36.
145 In re Unterweser Reederei, GmBH, 428 F.2d 888, 890 (5th Cir. 1970), aff'd on
reh 'g en banc, 446 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1971), vacated sub nom., M/S Bremen v. Zapata
Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
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remained unclear when comity must prevail.1"
IV. Significance of the Case
Prior to Kaepa, courts applying the relaxed standard of comity
had been vague in describing the role international comity should
play in 'the consideration of antisuit injunctions.147 However, in
Kaepa the Fifth Circuit enunciated a much clearer standard for
comity which compelled respect for the jurisdiction of a foreign
forum only under an "actual threat" to foreign relations. 48 In
declaring this actual threat standard, the Fifth Circuit broadened
the gap between the relaxed standard of comity, which now allows
a district court to enjoin foreign litigation unless it finds a real
threat to international comity,149 and the strict standard, which
"presume[s] a threat to international comity whenever an
injunction is sought against litigating in a foreign court."'' 0
14 Cf Philips Medical Sys. Int'l B.V. v. Bruetman, 8 F.3d 600, 605 (7th Cir. 1993)
(noting that because neither the U.S. State Department nor the foreign office of
Argentina complained to the district court, it was unlikely relations between the two
nations had been put at risk).
147 The Seventh Circuit noted that the difference between the two standards of
comity had to do "with the inferences to be drawn in the absence of information."
Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., Inc., 10 F.3d 425, 431 (7th Cir. 1993). The
Seventh Circuit also suggested that the relaxed standard demanded some evidence that
the antisuit injunction would impair comity. Id. However, the Seventh Circuit's
decision in Allendale did not go so far as to set a clear evidentiary standard. Rather, the
Seventh Circuit avoided setting such a standard by shrewdly stating that the relaxed
standard required "some indication that [the injunction] really would throw a monkey
wrench, however small, into the foreign relations of the United States." Id. (emphasis
added).
148 Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 624, 627 (5th Cir. 1996), reh'g, en banc,
denied, 83 F.3d 421 (5th Cir. 1996), petitionfor cert.filed (U.S. June 17, 1996).
149 Kaepa, 76 F.3d at 630 (Garza, J., dissenting).
SO Allendale, 10 F.3d at 431. Although the Supreme Court has not declared under
what circumstances a federal court must refrain from interfering with the jurisdiction of
foreign courts, an analogy may be made to the Court's general rule that federal courts
and state courts should refrain from interfering with each others' jurisdiction. Donovan
v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 412 (1964). Where jurisdiction is in personam, parallel
actions in federal and state courts are generally allowed to proceed, at least until one
court enters a judgment upon which res judicata may be pled in the other court. Id. An
exception to the rule is that a court, proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, may claim
exclusive jurisdiction. Id. This rule allowing parallel domestic suits has been useful in
the consideration of antisuit injunctions affecting foreign forums. See Laker Airways v.
Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 926-27 (D.C. Cir. 1984). It should be
noted, however, that Congress has authorized federal courts to stay the proceedings of
state courts "where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its
judgments." 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1994). Congress has also authorized federal courts to
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Although the actual threat standard empowers courts to protect
litigants against vexatious and oppressive litigation, it raises
troubling questions regarding the proper role of courts in foreign
policy and focuses attention on alternate judicial means of
navigating the delicate realm of international comity.
The actual threat standard put forth in Kaepa clarified the
standing of comity in the Fifth Circuit. Kaepa instructed district
courts in the Fifth Circuit to evaluate the actual effect of enjoining
foreign litigation. 5 ' Without some concrete evidence of harm to
foreign relations, the district courts are to assume that no such
harm exists.' In this respect, Kaepa freed district courts to wield
their equitable authority to enjoin oppressive litigation. However,
the Fifth Circuit's method of granting this freedom is not free from
criticism.
The actual threat standard exacerbates two issues upon which
critics have attacked the relaxed standard of comity.'53 The most
troublesome criticism of the actual threat standard is that it
requires the district court to determine the political effect of an
antisuit injunction.5 4 Authorities have questioned whether courts
have the ability or the authority to make such determinations. ' A
court that undertakes to evaluate foreign policy could be seen to
intrude on the power of other governmental branches to manage
foreign relations. 5 6 It has been suggested that a court could avoid
such an intrusion by soliciting an executive opinion as to the
"issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and
agreeable to the usages and principles of law." 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1994). These
provisions suggest that Congress may intervene to empower federal courts to protect
their jurisdiction against foreign interference. For a further discussion of federal
injunctive relief from state court proceedings, see Michael G. Collins, The Right to
Avoid Trial: Justifying Federal Court Intervention Into Ongoing State Court
Proceedings,66 N.C. L. REv. 49 (1987).
'"' Kaepa, 76 F.3d at 630 (Garza, J., dissenting).
152 Id. (Garza, J., dissenting).
153 See, e.g., Paul, supra note
I-,at 50, 75.
154 See Kaepa, 76 F.3d. at 630 (Garza, J., dissenting) (stating that antisuit
injunctions are essentially an intrusion into the realm of international economic policy
that should be left to the legislature and to the treaty making process).
155 See Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 951 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (stating that "courts inherently find it difficult neutrally to balance competing
foreign interests"); Paul, supra note 1, at 75 (noting that courts are not "equipped to
negotiate political disputes").
156 Paul, supra note 1, at 50.
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international effect of an antisuit injunction.'57 However, even if
courts could obtain such executive opinions, threats to
international relations are not always apparent at the time an
antisuit injunction is issued.15 Consequently, executive authorities
may prove as ineffective as the courts in making such premature
determinations. As the dissent in Kaepa noted "[i]t is precisely
this 'troubling uncertainty... that cautions us to make the

respectful deference underlying international comity the rule rather
' Furthermore, a court that requests executive
than the exception."159
opinions on matters of foreign policy might jeopardize its standing
as an independent60 legal authority by appearing to act at the behest
of the executive.

A second criticism of the actual threat standard is that it may
161
allow many more anti-foreign-suit injunctions to be issued.
Such an aggressive position by the federal circuits may invite
foreign courts to retaliate by issuing injunctions restricting the
jurisdiction of American courts. 62 Where in Laker Airways the
American court took defensive action to protect its jurisdiction, a
foreign court is likely to do the same in response to an American
injunction. The ultimate effect of this battle between jurisdictions
would be to leave the parties with no remedy at all.' 63 Moreover, a
jurisdictional battle between forums would subvert the traditional
justifications for comity:
reciprocity, utility, courtesy, and
morality.' 64 Finally, since there is simply no way to predict the
standards by which various foreign courts will decide whether to

15'See Philips Medical Sys. Int'l B.V. v. Bruetman, 8 F.3d 600, 605 (7th Cir. 1993)
(dictum) (suggesting that executive opinions from either nation may have aided in
deciding whether a threat to relations existed).
158 Kaepa, 76 F.3d at 631 (Garza, J., dissenting).
159Id. (Garza, J., dissenting).
160 Paul, supra note 1, at 50 n.209.
161 Kaepa, 76 F.3d at 631 (Garza, J., 'dissenting) (noting that under the majority
standard "concurrent jurisdiction involving a foreign tribunal will rarely, if ever,
withstand the request for an antisuit injunction").
162

See Kaepa, 76 F.3d at 630 (Garza, J.,
dissenting); Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at

927.
163 See Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 927; See also Peck v. Jenness, 48 U.S. 612, 625
(1849) (noting that a similar effect would be realized between states engaged in a
jurisdictional battle).
164 Paul, supra note 1, at 53.
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retaliate to an American injunction,'65 an increase in the number of
injunctions issued by American courts would increase uncertainty
in the international market place. Accordingly, the actual threat
standard announced in Kaepa has raised important issues
regarding the judiciary's proper role, if any, in foreign relations,
leaving commentators wondering if there is a better way than
judicial comity to protect international relations.'6
V. Conclusion
The actual threat standard, enunciated in Kaepa, has
underscored the difficulty courts have in determining the existence
and the nature of a political conflict.167 As one commentator has
noted: "[p]olitical conflicts that arise with foreign governments
should be resolved through political negotiation, not litigation.
The courts are neither constitutionally competent to rewrite
legislation, nor equipped to negotiate political disputes., 168 Courts
should therefore adjudicate private disputes without resorting to
political judgments regarding the effect of their actions. This is
not to say that the courts should ignore the principles of comity.
To the contrary, courts should give great deference to international
comity by allowing political disputes with foreign nations to be
decided in executive and legislative forums which have the
authority and ability to resolve them properly. 69 Since the strict
standard of comity presumes that an antisuit injunction will
adversely affect foreign relations, courts should adhere to this
deferential standard and grant antisuit injunctions only where the
court's jurisdiction would be threatened or where important
policies of the forum would be evaded by foreign litigation. 7 0
Id. at 79 ("There is no clear evidence of a customary international norm
compelling comity on the basis of international law.").
166 See Paul, supra note 1, at 74-77; see also Laura M. Salava, Balancing Comity
With Antisuit Injunctions: Considerations Beyond Jurisdiction, 20 J. LEGIS. 267, 270
(1994).
167 Kaepa, 76 F.3d at 630 (Garza, J., dissenting).
168 Paul, supra note 1,at 75.
165

169

Paul, supra note 1, at 75.

See China Trade & Dev. Corp. v. M.V.Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir.
1987); Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 927 (D.C. Cir.
1984). Commentators have viewed the Laker Airways analysis favorably. See, e.g.,
Aryeh S. Friedman, Laker Airways: The Dilemma of Concurrent Jurisdiction and
170
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Although this rule seems harsh to litigants faced with the cost
and inconvenience of litigating in forums that are thousands of
miles apart, courts have other mechanisms that do not threaten
comity to accommodate distressed litigants. First, the distressed
litigant can petition the foreign court to dismiss the foreign
litigation on the grounds of forum non conveniens. 171 This solution
avoids a jurisdictional dispute since the foreign court can decide
for itself whether the litigation before it is vexatious or
harassing."' If a forum non conveniens dismissal is not available
or is denied by the foreign forum, the litigant can petition one
forum to stay its proceedings until the resolution of the case in the
other forum.1 73 The litigant could then plead res judicata to
expedite the later litigation.'74 Both of these solutions allow a
litigant to avoid or minimize vexatious litigation without asking
one court to impede the jurisdiction of another.175 Since less
intrusive measures are available to litigants faced with vexatious
and oppressive litigation, antisuit injunctions which interfere with
the jurisdiction of a foreign court should be granted only in
extreme circumstances where foreign litigation would threaten the
jurisdiction of the local forum or would allow the evasion of
important policies of the forum.'
ConflictingNational Policies, 11 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 181, 182 (1985) (stating that Laker
Airways "suggests a possible solution to the concurrent jurisdiction quandary"); Daryl
A. Libow, Note, The Laker Antitrust Litigation: The Jurisdictional 'Rule of Reason'
Applied to TransnationalInjunctive Relief,71 CORNELL L. REv. 645, 666 (1986) ("[T]he
rule of reason analysis in the context of transnational injunctive relief will inject an
element of certainty and consistency .... ).
171 Kaepa, 76 F.3d at 632 (Garza, J., dissenting). For a general discussion of forum
non conveniens, see Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
172 Cf. Kaepa, 76 F.3d at 632 (Garza, J., dissenting) (noting that "[t]he district court
is not in a position.., to make the forum non conveniens determination on behalf of the
Japanese court").
173 Canadian Filters Ltd. v. Lear-Siegler, Inc., 412 F.2d 577, 579 (1st Cir. 1969).
171 See Gau Shan Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349, 1352 (6th Cir. 1992).
However, where a foreign forum refuses to recognize an American judgment, a
permanent injunction may be appropriate to give the American judgment meaningful
effect. See Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., Inc., 10 F.3d 425, 433 (7th Cir.
1993).
175 Kaepa, 76 F.3d at 633-34 (Garza, J., dissenting).
176 See China Trade & Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir.
1987); Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 927 (D.C. Cir.
1984). One commentator has proposed that these less intrusive measures be combined
into a four-step process for courts to follow before granting an injunction:
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Because the world is becoming increasingly interdependent, 7
concurrent jurisdiction with foreign forums will become a more
frequent issue in commercial litigation. As the D.C. Circuit noted,
"comity serves our international system like the mortar which
cements together a brick house."'' The lack of a consistent policy
toward international comity will become a menacing threat to the
integrity of our international "mortar." Therefore, the need for a
consistent policy toward anti-foreign-suit injunctions requires that
the split among the circuits regarding the proper standard of
international comity be settled. To guide the lower courts in
addressing this complex issue, the Supreme Court should intervene
79
and declare the proper standard of international judicial comity.'
ARIF

S. HAQ

First, [the American court] should determine whether the parties and issues in
both the American and foreign actions are identical, so that resolving one
action would dispose of the other ....Second, the American court should
determine, sua sponte if necessary, whether it should dismiss or stay the action
before it on the ground of forum non conveniens. Third, if the American court
decides that it is the most convenient forum to decide the case, that court should
require the party requesting the injunction to ask the foreign court to dismiss or
stay its proceeding on the ground of forum non conveniens. Fourth, and only if
the foreign court refuses to dismiss or stay the suit before it, the American court
should consider whether an injunction is necessary to prevent the evasion of
important domestic policies.
Teresa D. Baer, Note, Injunctions Against the Prosecution of Litigation Abroad:
Towards a TransnationalApproach, 37 STAN. L. REv. 155, 175 (1984).
177Kaepa, 76 F.3d at 629 (Garza, J., dissenting).
178Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 937.
179Such a declaration may come in the form of a modification to Rule 65 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which governs the granting of injunctions. See Salava,
supra note 166, at 270 (suggesting that Rule 65 be amended to incorporate the strict
standard of comity in granting antisuit injunctions). The Supreme Court's power to
prescribe rules of procedure for federal courts is derived from a Congressional mandate.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (1994). Therefore, a rule-based declaration by the Court would
have the additional benefit of implicit Congressional authorization.

